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Abstract
We show that any cooperative TU game is the maximum of a finite collection of convex
games. This max-convex decomposition can be refined by using convex games with non-
negative dividends for all coalitions of at least two players. As a consequence of the above
results we show that the class of modular games is a set of generators of the distributive
lattice of all cooperative TU games. Finally, we characterize zero-monotonic games using
a strong max-convex decomposition.
Resum
En aquest treball es demostra que tot joc cooperatiu d’utilitat transferible (o joc co-
operatiu TU) es pot representar com el ma`xim d’una col.leccio´ finita de jocs convexes.
Aquest resultat es pot refinar utilitzant jocs quasi-positius. E´s a dir, jocs convexes on els
dividends associats a les coalicions de dos o me´s jugadors so´n positius o nuls. Aquests
resultats permeten provar que els jocs modulars formen un sistema de generadors del reti-
cle distributiu que formen el jocs cooperatius TU. Finalment, es dona una caracteritzacio´
dels jocs zero-mono`tons imposant una condicio´ me´s forta: que tots els jocs que intervenen
en la descomposicio´ tinguin el mateix conjunt d’imputacions.
Key words: Cooperative TU-game, convex games, modular games, zero-monotonic
games, lattice.
JEL Classification: C71, C78
1 Introduction
In classical convex analysis, the maximum of two real-valued convex functions is a convex
function. However, in the class of convex cooperative TU games, the maximum as a binary
operation does not preserve convexity. This poses a natural question: which games can
be expressed as the maximum of a finite collection of convex games?
Representing games as a maximum (minimum) of other games has been discussed
by several authors. Rosenmu¨ller and Weidner (1974) provide a maximum decomposition
theorem for any convex game in terms of what they call affine set functions. Kalai
and Zemel (1982) provide a representation for non-negative totally balanced games as
the minimum of a finite collection of modular games. Extending the results of Dubey
(1975), Einy (1988) proves that any monotonic game can be uniquely decomposed as the
maximum of join-irreducible games (in the sense of lattice theory with the standard order).
Curiel and Tijs (1991) characterize concave (convex) games by means of the maximum
(minimum) operator applied to a particular type of modular games –those generated by
the marginal worth vectors (the so-called additive marginal games).
The main aim of this paper is to study the role of some subclasses of convex games
in the lattice of all cooperative TU games. Interestingly, convex games together with
the minimum operator characterize the class of totally balanced games. This can be
easily proved by combining the results of Kalai-Zemel (1982) and Curiel-Tijs (1991). Our
starting point is therefore to analyze the behavior of the maximum operator applied to
convex games.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the general notation and some
definitions. Section 3 contains our main result: any cooperative TU game can be expressed
as the maximum of a finite collection of convex games. These games can be selected from
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a particular class of convex games –those with non-negative dividends (Harsanyi, 1963)
associated to coalitions of at least two players. From the above result, we can prove
that the class of modular games forms a set of generators of the distributive lattice of
cooperative TU games. To end this section, we characterize zero-monotonic games using a
(strong) max-convex decomposition. Finally, Section 4 presents some concluding remarks.
2 Notations and terminologies
We denote by N = {1, . . . , n} a finite set of players and by 2N the set of all subsets
(coalitions) of N . We will use S ⊂ T to indicate strict inclusion, that is S ⊆ T but
S 6= T . By |S| we will denote the cardinality of the coalition S ⊆ N .
A cooperative game with transferable utility (a game), is a pair (N, v) where N is the
set of players and v : 2N −→ R is the characteristic function with v(Ø) = 0. The set of all
games with player set N is denoted by GN . It is a well-known result that GN is a (2n− 1)
linear space, where n = |N |. Given a game (N, v) and a coalition S ⊆ N , we define the
subgame (S, v|S) by v|S(Q) := v(Q), for any Q ⊆ S.
Let RN stand for the space of real-valued vectors indexed by N , x = (xi)i∈N , and for
all S ⊆ N , x(S) = ∑i∈S xi, with the convention x(Ø) = 0. In this way, any vector can
be viewed as a game.
Given a coalition T ⊆ N, T 6= ∅, the unanimity game (N, uT ) is defined by
uT (S) :=

1 if T ⊆ S,
0 otherwise.
The set of unanimity games {(N, uT ) | ∅ 6= T ⊆ N} forms a basis of GN and the
coordinates of a game in this basis are the unanimity coordinates (or dividends) of the
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game. For any (N, v) ∈ GN , v =∑∅ 6=S⊆T λT · uT , where λT =∑S⊆T (−1)|T |−|S| v(S), for
all ∅ 6= T ⊆ N .
The imputation set of the game (N, v) is defined by I(N, v) := {x ∈ Rn |x(N) =
v(N) andxi ≥ v({i}) for all i ∈ N}. The core of the game (N, v) is defined by C(N, v) :=
{x ∈ I(N, v) | x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊆ N}.
A game (N, v) is convex (Shapley, 1972) if, for every S, T ⊆ N , v(S) + v(T ) ≤
v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ). We denote by CN the class of all convex games with player set N ,
which forms a full-dimensional polyhedral cone in the (2n − 1) linear space GN . Each
unanimity game (N, uT ) is a convex game.
A subset of convex games is the set of almost positive games (Derks, Haller and Peters,
2000), denoted by
CN2 :=
{ ∑
T⊆N,T 6=∅
λT · uT | λT ≥ 0, for allT ⊆ N with |T | ≥ 2
}
.
Notice that there are no sign conditions over the dividends associated to singletons.
A game (N, v) is zero-monotonic if for any pair of coalitions S, T , S ⊂ T ⊆ N , it holds
v(S) +
∑
i∈T\S v({i}) ≤ v(T ). A game (N, v) is called modular if there exists a vector
x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ RN such that for every S ⊆ N , v(S) =
∑
i∈S xi. By GNmod we denote
the class of N-person modular games.
Given the finite set of players N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, we shall denote by SN the set of all
permutations over N . Given a game (N, v) and a permutation θ ∈ SN , the marginal worth
vector associated to θ, denoted by mvθ ∈ RN , is defined by (mvθ)θ(k) = v({θ(1), . . . , θ(k)})−
v({θ(1), . . . , θ(k − 1)}), for k ∈ {2, . . . , n}, and (mvθ)θ(1) = v({θ(1)}).
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3 Max-convex decompositions
To illustrate max-convex decompositions, we shall describe some examples. The first one
is the classical model of assignment games introduced by Shapley and Shubik (1972).
Consider a bilateral market with two types of traders, say sellers M = {1, 2, . . . ,m} and
buyers M
′
= {1′ , 2′ , . . . ,m′}, and an assignment non-negative matrix A ∈Mm×m′ , where
the element ai j′ ≥ 0 is interpreted as the potential gains for each trading pair, i ∈M and
j
′ ∈M ′ . The value of any coalition S ⊆M ∪M ′ is then defined as
v(S) := max
{
ai1 j′1
+ . . .+ aik j′k
}
, (1)
where the maximum is taken over all arrangements of 2k distinct players i1, . . . , ik ∈ S∩M
and j
′
1, . . . , j
′
k ∈ S ∩M ′ , with k = min{|S ∩M |, |S ∩M ′|}.
Let us denote byM(M,M ′) the set of all possible arrangements among players of both
sides of the market (or matchings), i.e. all possible arrangements of 2k distinct players,
where k = min{|M |, |M ′|}. It is easy to verify that the previously described assignment
game can be rewritten in a more compact way as
v = max
µ∈M(M,M ′ )
 ∑
(i,j′ )∈µ
ai j′ · u{i j′}
 . (2)
Hence, an assignment game is no more than the maximum of a finite collection of some
particular convex games: positive linear combinations of the unanimity games associated
to the mixed-pair coalitions.
Another example of max-convex decomposition is the case of monotonic simple games,
which have been widely used to formalize voting situations. Formally, (N, v) ∈ GN is a
monotonic simple game if v(N) = 1, v(S) ∈ {0, 1} for all S ⊆ N , and v(S) ≤ v(T ) for
any S ⊆ T ⊆ N .
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Any monotonic simple game can be written as
v = max
S∈Mv
{uS} , (3)
whereMv denotes the minimal winning coalitions of (N, v), namely, those coalitions with
value 1 (winning) without proper winning subcoalitions.
Let us point out a difference between the above two max-convex decompositions. In
the case of monotonic simple games, all convex games involved (expression (3)) have the
same efficiency level as the original game: uS(N) = v(N) = 1, S ∈ Mv. Notice that
this is not the case for the max-convex decomposition associated to the assignment game
(expression (2)). However, it easy to modify the max-convex decomposition to achieve
the same efficiency level in all components. Indeed, let v = max{v1, . . . , vk} be a max-
convex decomposition for the game (N, v), where (N, v1), . . . , (N, vk) are convex games,
not necessarily with the same efficiency. Then, the game (N, v) can be written as
v = max
i=1,2,...,k
{vi + (v(N)− vi(N)) · uN} . (4)
Notice that the games involved in this decomposition are convex with the same efficiency
as (N, v), since v(N)−vi(N) ≥ 0 for all i = 1, 2, . . . , k, and the class of convex games forms
a cone. Then, a max-convex decomposition can we rewritten with the same efficiency for
all games. This feature may be useful to connect solutions of the original game with
solutions of the games involved in the decomposition.
We will now prove that any game (even if it is not balanced, or monotonic,...) has
a max-convex decomposition (Theorem 1). To prove this result we use an induction
argument. In this way, we have a method to find at least one max-convex decomposition
for any game.
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Theorem 1 For any game (N, v) there exists a finite collection of convex games,
(N, v1), . . . , (N, vk) ∈ CN , all of which have the same efficiency as (N, v), such that
v = max{v1, . . . , vk}.
Proof: We use an induction argument over the number of players.
• Let (N, v) ∈ GN with |N | = 2 and (c1, c2) ∈ R2 be a vector such that, for any
i ∈ {1, 2}, ci = min
S⊆N,i∈S
{v(S) − v(S\{i})}. Now, define the 2-person games (N, v1)
and (N, v2), as:
v1 := c1 · u{1} + v({2}) · u{2} + [v(N)− v(N\{1})− c1] · uN ,
v2 := v({1}) · u{1} + c2 · u{2} + [v(N)− v(N\{2})− c2] · uN .
Clearly, (N, v1) and (N, v2) are convex games with the same efficiency as (N, v) and
v = max{v1, v2}.
• Assume that the statement of the theorem holds for any game (N, v), with |N | ≤
r − 1, and let us prove that it also holds for |N | = r.
Let (N, v) ∈ GN and for i ∈ N consider (N\{i}, v|N\{i}), the subgame associated to
the coalition N\{i}. By the induction hypothesis, there exists a finite number of
convex games, (N\{i}, wi1), . . . , (N\{i}, wiki) ∈ CN\{i}, such that
wi1(N\{i}) = . . . = wiki(N\{i}) = v|N\{i}(N\{i}) = v(N\{i})
and
v|N\{i} = max{wi1, . . . , wiki}. (5)
Now, let j ∈ {1, . . . , ki} and define the game (N, w¯ij) as follows:
w¯ij(S) :=

wij(S) if i 6∈ S,
wij(S\{i}) otherwise.
(6)
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From the convexity of the game (N\{i}, wij), it follows that (N, w¯ij) ∈ CN . Notice
that, if {λT}T⊆N\{i},T 6=∅ are the unanimity coordinates of (N\{i}, wij) in GN\{i},
then w¯ij =
∑
T⊆N\{i},T 6=∅
λT · uT .
In order to have a set of convex games with the same efficiency of (N, v), define, for
any i ∈ N , ci = min
S⊆N,i∈S
{v(S)− v(S\{i})}, and the games {(N, w˜ij)}j=1,...,ki as
w˜ij := ci · u{i} + w¯ij + [v(N)− v(N\{i})− ci] · uN . (7)
Obviously w˜ij(N) = v(N) and (N, w˜
i
j) ∈ CN , for any i ∈ N and j ∈ {1, . . . , ki},
since v(N)− v(N\{i})− ci ≥ 0.
At this point we list two properties of these games, (N, w˜ij), which can be derived
directly from expressions (5) and (7):
P1 For any i ∈ N , any j ∈ {1, . . . , ki} and any S ⊆ N\{i}, w˜ij(S) ≤ v(S) and there
exists ji ∈ {1, . . . , ki} such that w˜iji(S) = v(S).
P2 For any i ∈ N , any j ∈ {1, . . . , ki} and any S ⊂ N , i ∈ S, w˜ij(S) ≤ ci+v(S\{i})
and there exists ji ∈ {1, . . . , ki} such that w˜iji(S) = ci + v(S\{i}).
Finally, to end the proof we only have to check that (N, v) = (N,w) where
w := max
i=1,...,n
{
max
j=1,...,ki
{w˜ij}
}
.
Clearly w(N) = v(N). Let S ⊂ N be a proper coalition of N and let i ∈ N\S. By
P1, we know that there exists ji ∈ {1, . . . , ki} such that w˜iji(S) = v(S) and, for any
j ∈ {1, . . . , ki}, w˜ij(S) ≤ v(S).
On the other hand, by P2, for any h ∈ S, there exists jh ∈ {1, . . . , kh} such that
w˜hjh(S) = ch + v(S\{h}) and, for any j ∈ {1, . . . , kh}, w˜hj (S) ≤ ch + v(S\{h}).
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Hence, we can conclude that
w(S) = max
{
max
h∈S
{ch + v(S\{h})}, v(S)
}
= v(S),
since ch ≤ v(S)− v(S\{h}), for any S ⊂ N and h ∈ S. 
Notice that ci could be chosen arbitrarily as long as ci ≤ min
S⊆N,i∈S
{v(S) − v(S\{i}},
for all i ∈ N , and thus the decomposition is not unique. The max-convex decomposition
obtained in the above theorem can be refined by using only almost positive games, i.e. by
using convex games with non-negative dividends for all non-singleton coalitions, as the
next corollary shows.
Corollary 1 Any game (N, v) can be expressed as the maximum of a finite collection of
almost positive games, all of which have the same efficiency.
Proof: It is sufficient to replace the induction hypothesis used in the proof of Theorem 1
by the following: any game (N, v), with |N | ≤ r−1, can be decomposed as the maximum
of a finite collection of almost positive games, and to check that the case |N | = 2 also
holds under this condition. 
This general decomposition result cannot be refined by using the modular subclass of
convex games. Indeed, consider the following example.
Example: Let (N, v) be a 3-person monotonic game where v({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N ,
v({1, 2}) = v({1, 3}) = 2, v({2, 3}) = 5 and v(N) = 6.
Suppose that v = max{m1, . . . ,mk}, where {(N,mi)}i=1,...,k ∈ GNmod with m1(N) =
. . . = mk(N) = 6.
For any i ∈ N , v({i}) = max{m1({i}), . . . ,mk({i})} = 0 and so, for some h∗ ∈
{1, . . . , k}, mh∗({i}) = 0. But then, by efficiency, mh∗(N\{i}) = 6, which implies
max{m1(N\{i}), . . . ,mk(N\{i})} ≥ 6 > v(N\{i}), which leads to a contradiction.
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Notice that even if we drop the condition that the efficiency in the decomposition in
the modular games is the same, we still do not get all the class of cooperative games
since, if v = max{m1, . . . ,mk}, then −v = min{−m1, . . . ,−mk}, and this game is always
totally balanced (Kalai and Zemel, 1982). Therefore, our general result (Theorem 1)
can be summarized saying that the class of convex games describes the whole class of
cooperative games from a lattice point of view.
Once we have proved our general max-convex decomposition result, it seems natural
to connect it with the decomposition reached by Curiel and Tijs (1991). These authors
prove that any convex game is the minimum of its marginal worth vectors taken as
modular games, and vice-versa. By combining these two results, we find that any game
is the max-min or the min-max of a suitable family of modular games, all of which have
the same efficiency (Corollary 2). This result has a nice interpretation in terms of the
lattice structure of games, since it says that modular games are a set of generators of all
cooperative games.
Corollary 2 For any game (N, v), there exists a finite collection of modular games,
(N,mij) ∈ GNmod, with i = 1, . . . , k and j = 1, . . . , h, all of which have the same efficiency
as (N, v), such that
v = max
i=1,...,k
{
min
j=1,...,h
{mij}
}
= min
j=1,...,h
{
max
i=1,...,k
{mij}
}
.
Proof: Let (N, v) be a game. By Theorem 1, we know that there exists a finite collection
of convex games with the same efficiency as (N, v): (N, vj) ∈ CN with j = 1, . . . , k, such
that v = max{v1, . . . , vk}. On the other hand, since any convex game is the minimum
of its extreme core points, namely, its marginal worth vectors, taken as modular games
(Curiel and Tijs (1991)), we can write vj = min
θ∈SN
{mvjθ }, for any j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, and obtain
the decomposition v = maxj=1,...,k
{
minθ∈SN{mvjθ }
}
.
11
Now define the game (N,w), where w := minθ∈SN
{
maxj=1,...,k{mvjθ }
}
. Notice that
v(N) = w(N). Let ∅ 6= S ⊂ N . By convexity of (N, vj), mvjθ (S) ≥ vj(S), for
any j ∈ {1, . . . , k} and any θ ∈ SN . In addition, there exists θ∗ ∈ SN such that
m
vj
θ∗(S) = vj(S), for any j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Hence, w(S) = minθ∈SN
{
maxj=1,...,k{mvjθ (S)}
}
=
maxj=1,...,k{mvjθ∗(S)} = maxj=1,...,k{vj(S)} = v(S). 
Finally, let us analyze the behavior of a strong max-convex representation by imposing
the additional condition that the games involved in the decomposition have the same
imputation set. This question is interesting because many of the solutions for cooperative
games are defined as imputations: if the original game and the convex games of the
decomposition have the same imputation set, we can compare and analyze solutions among
them. In Corollary 3, we see that this strong max-convex decomposition characterizes the
class of zero-monotonic games.
Corollary 3 A game (N, v) is zero-monotonic if and only if there exists a finite collection
of convex games, (N, v1), . . . , (N, vk) ∈ CN , such that v = max{v1, . . . , vk}, with I(N, v) =
I(N, v1) = . . . = I(N, vk). Moreover, this decomposition can be taken in CN2 .
Proof: To prove the ”only if” part, it is sufficient to notice that, in the proof of
Theorem 1, if (N, v) is a zero-monotonic game, then minS⊆N,i∈S{v(S) − v(S\{i})} =
v({i}), for all i ∈ N , and all the subgames preserve the zero-monotonicity. From Corollary
2, the games involved in the decomposition can be taken in CN2 .
The converse part trivially holds from the fact that any convex game is zero-monotonic
and the class of zero-monotonic games with the same imputation set is closed under
the maximum operation (recall that this is not true if the games do not have the same
imputation set). 
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4 Concluding remarks
The above results are an attempt to clarify the lattice structure of cooperative games
and the special position of some classes within it. These results should help us to find
relationships between the games involved.
For example, an interesting application is to find sufficient conditions for guaranteeing
that the core of one of the convex games used in a max-convex decomposition is a stable
set for the original game. To illustrate this idea, consider a monotonic simple game
(N, v) and expression (3): v = maxS∈Mv {uS} . It is well-known that the core of each
unanimity game involved in this decomposition is a stable set for the game (N, v). In
this way, the famous counterexamples on the framework of stability (see Lucas, 1992)
can be reanalyzed using a max-convex decomposition. Moreover, the existence of several
max-convex decompositions could help us to find different stable sets for the original
game.
Finally, from Theorem 1 and Corollary 2, the core of a game can be expressed as the
intersection of the cores of convex games which form part of a max-convex decomposition.
This property may be useful for characterizing the core and other set-solutions from a
lattice point of view.
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